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Abstract 
Smets and Kennes have claimed that the transferable belief model, a decision and inference 
procedure based upon the Dempster-Shafer formalism, never exposes the believer to a kind of 
betting conundrum known as a “Dutch book”. A Dutch book is constructed against the model in 
an elaboration of an example proposed by Smets and Kennes. A condition which permits this Dutch 
book is identified, and is shown to conflict with an intuition about reasonable belief revision which 
is not confined to the probabilist community. 0 1998 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights 
reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
The transferable belief model [6] combines elements of two belief representation 
formalisms: Bayesian probabilities and the Dempster-Shafer calculus. Smets and Kennes 
present the transferable belief model as a nonnative construct, i.e., the model offers advice 
about how to represent beliefs, revise them based upon evidence, and apply them to choices 
among alternative wagering commitments. 
Dempster-Shafer analysis assigns a nonnegative number, sometimes called a muss, to 
every distinct logical sentence in a finite domain of sentences which is closed under the 
usual connectives. The sum of all masses assigned is unity. A popular first step in the 
interpretation of these numbers involves belieffunctions, defined as 
bel(X) = c m(Y), 
Y=+X 
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where be& ) is the belief function, X and Y are sentences in the domain, and m(Y) is the 
mass assigned to sentence Y. The semantics attributed to the belief functions varies among 
authors, but a common theme is that if be&X) 3 beZ(Z), then X is no less credible then 2, 
with the precise meaning of credibility being one of the things about which authors differ. 
Formally, probability distributions and Dempster-Shafer representations are closely 
related. Kyburg [4] has shown that the Dempster-Shafer belief functions can be interpreted 
as numeric bounds in a system of simultaneous linear inequality constraints 
p(X) 3 be&X) for ail sentences X in the domain, 
c P(X) = 1, 
X 
whose solutions are a set of ordinary probability distributions. 
For belief revision, Bayesians use Bayes’ rule while Dempster-Shafer adherents use 
Dempster’s rule. Kyburg notes an interesting relationship between the two approaches. 
Suppose some sentence E in the domain of interest were revealed to be true, a natural 
representation of “observing evidence” in both formalisms. One could then use Bayes’ 
rule to revise the set of probability distributions described in the last paragraph, yielding a 
new set of probabilities p(X I E). One could also use Dempster’s rule to derive new belief 
functions beZ( X 1 E). Kyburg shows that for any sentence X, if 
p(X 1 E) E [LB, UB] for all p( ) in the Bayesian set 
then 
LB < beZ(X 1 E) < UJj. 
If one then considered the probabilistic interpretation of beZ(X / E), the set of probability 
distributions whose typical constraint is 
q(X) 3 beZ(X I -4 
and examined the intervals implied by those probabilities 
4(X) E [LD-S, UD-Sl 
for all q ( ) in the Dempster-Shafer interpretative set where the intervals are tight, then 
In words, the Dempster-Shafer intervals are always at least as specific as the corresponding 
Bayesian intervals. It is routine for the Dempster-Shafer intervals to be strictly more 
specific. 
The transferable belief model assumes that beliefs can be represented according to 
the Dempster-Shafer conventions, and that when evidence is observed, beliefs change 
according to Dempster’s rule. For gambling purposes, the transferable belief model selects 
one particular probability distribution from among the solutions of the linear constraint 
interpretation of the Dempster-Shafer representation. This single probability distribution 
is used to analyze any prospective wagers in the usual probabilist expected utility fashion. 
Once chosen, a probability distribution continues to regulate gambling choices until new 
evidence is actuaZZy observed. This is an important point, since wagers may depend upon 
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whether or not some potential evidence is observed in the future. If new evidence were 
observed during the life of the wager, then this might change the observer’s beliefs and so 
influence expectations about the availability of pay-offs which are contingent on events or 
revelations which will occur after the new evidence is seen. The transferable belief model 
includes the rule that the credibilities of all uncertain events are evaluated according to 
the beliefs encoded in the probability distribution which is in force when each wagering 
decision is made. 
To explain this rule, Smets and Kennes (at 207) distinguish “factual” conditioning from 
“hypothetical” conditioning. In factual conditioning, if some sentence A is learned to be 
true, then the model performs a Dempster’s rule belief revision based upon A, and chooses 
a probability distribution according to the result. In hypothetical conditioning, A is not 
known to be true, but a bet can be offered which will be “called off” (i.e., the bet’s pay-off 
is the status quo) if A turns out to be false. The model does not perform a Dempster-Shafer 
belief revision based upon A in order to evaluate such bets, but rather uses a Bayesian 
analysis of the current chosen probability distribution. 
So, for instance (as discussed in Section 4.4 of Smets and Kennes [6]), one might begin 
a problem episode with the knowledge that there are three candidates for a job, and have 
some beliefs about their relative prospects. These beliefs are represented in the Dempster- 
Shafer fashion, which leads to the selection of a probability distribution, and one may place 
bets according to its counsel. Later on, one learns for certain that one of the candidates has 
not been hired. This causes a Dempster’s rule revision followed by the selection of a new 
probability distribution to which newly offered bets are referred for evaluation. Had one 
not actually learned that the candidate was eliminated, but had merely been offered a bet 
between the other two candidates, then the original probability distribution would continue 
in force to evaluate the proposed wager, and Bayes’ rule would determine the relevant odds. 
2. Dutch book arguments 
Smets and Kennes motivate the revision conventions just described as a precaution 
against Dutch books. A Dutch book is a suite of gambles, each of which is acceptable to the 
believer, but which collectively commit the believer to a situation which is unambiguously 
inferior to that obtained by simply declining the entire suite. Dutch books are sometimes 
briefly characterized as agreements to place bets in such a way as to ensure a loss for 
certain, regardless of how the uncertain events in question turn out. 
That brief description may be misleading, however. Dutch book arguments rarely refer 
to any plausible threat. If concern about losses of this kind were a practical problem, 
then perhaps one could simply resolve to decline commitments which lead to such losses, 
regardless of any other beliefs one might hold [ 11. Unproblematic implementation of this 
resolution assumes, of course, that the believer appreciates the predicament in timely 
fashion, which may not be the case. 
In any event, practical loss is not the point. What is being evaluated is the advice offered 
by a normative formalism. The basis of the evaluation is a conflict with common sense, a 
classic comparison of a shallow problem representation with a deeper one. If a wagering 
problem is described one way, then the formalism counsels some course of action. If the 
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same schedule of contingent pay-offs is described in a different way, then common sense 
counsels the believer to do something else. It is irrelevant whether common sense prevails 
in the end or not; the rub is that unacceptable advice was offered at all by a formalism 
whose purpose is to offer good advice. 
It is uncontroversial that the usual kind of Bayesian methods do not suffer from Dutch 
books. Although it has been conjectured from time to time that only Bayesian belief 
revision methods are invulnerable to Dutch books, this is not a theorem. (See [2] for a 
narrative review of the voluminous literature on these points.) 
The Smets and Kennes position is, in brief compass, that the transferable belief 
model handles all wagers in the same fashion as an orthodox Bayesian would. Orthodox 
Bayesianism is free of Dutch books, hence the transferable belief model should be, too. 
No theorem on this point was proven, although the invulnerability of the model to Dutch 
books was asserted as true. 
As it turns out, some wagers are not handled in the same fashion as an orthodox Bayesian 
would. A betting problem is presented which slightly extends an example offered by 
Smets and Kennes. A Dutch book is constructed against the transferable belief model in 
this problem. A feature of the model and of the probabilistic constraint interpretation of 
Dempster-Shafer belief functions which allows this construction is identified. This feature 
is shown to conflict with a principle of inductive reasoning whose admirers within the 
artificial intelligence community are not confined to probabilists. 
3. The example problem 
Peter, Paul and Mary are candidates for a job. Exactly one of them will be hired. The 
award process is as follows. A fair coin is tossed. If the coin lands showing heads, 
then Mary gets the job. If the coin lands showing tails, then Mary does not get the 
job. The procedure for deciding between Peter and Paul in that case is not disclosed. 
The successful candidate will be revealed in the following manner. The name of 
one unsuccessjid candidate will be announced promptly after the hiring decision is 
made. The name of the other unsuccessful candidate will be announced after a brief 
interval. The procedure for deciding the order of announcements is by lot, with each 
unsuccessful candidate having an equal chance of being named first. 
The problem is similar to the Smets and Kennes “Mr. Jones Murder Mystery” in which 
Peter, Paul and Mary are contract killers suspected of a homicide and Peter turns out to have 
an alibi. The uncertainties in the hiring procedure used here exactly parallel those of the 
murder mystery. In the original version, however, Peter’s alibi is apparently an unexpected 
development and so is not ripe for betting. In the present version, the “alibi” event is 
scheduled and any candidate could have one. The announcement procedure described is 
similar to the method actually used in the annual Miss America contest to disclose who 
has gotten that particular job. 
Before the first announcement is made, Dempster-Shafer conventions assign the masses: 
Mary gets the job 0.5, 
Peter or Paul gets the job 0.5. 
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In the event that Peter’s name is announced first, Dempster’s rule revision yields: 
Mary gets the job 0.5, 
Paul gets the job 0.5. 
Peter and Paul’s situations are symmetric, so if Paul’s name is announced first, then the 
belief masses become: 
Mary gets the job 0.5, 
Peter gets the job 0.5. 
How these numbers are arrived at is fully explained in the Smets and Kennes paper, or 
any exposition of the Dempster-Shafer method. We can construct a Dutch book without 
detailing the beliefs which would prevail should Mary’s name be announced. 
The transferable belief model chooses the probability distribution 
p(Mary gets the job) = 0.5, 
p(Peter gets the job) = 0.25, 
p(Pau1 gets the job) = 0.25 
for use before any name is announced. If Peter’s name is announced first, then the chosen 
probability distribution is: 
p(Mary gets the job) = 0.5, 
p(Pau1 gets the job) = 0.5. 
If Paul’s name is announced first, then the chosen distribution is: 
p(Mary gets the job) = 0.5, 
p(Peter gets the job) = 0.5. 
Of these three distributions, only the lirst is peculiar to the transferable belief model. In 
the other two cases, the probability distributions are the only solutions of the system of 
simultaneous constraints built from the posterior Dempster-Shafer belief functions which 
was described earlier. 
The objective probability that Mary’s name will be called first is 0.25: the fair coin 
must show tails, and thereafter she must be picked in the drawing of lots. This is the 
only announcement probability which will figure in subsequent discussion. The value is 
consistent with the probability distribution chosen by the transferable belief model. 
One could, if one chose, perform the Dempster-Shafer analysis by explicitly represent- 
ing the prior knowledge of the announcement schedule. That is, one would at first assign 
the weights: 
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(Mary gets the job, Peter is dropped) = 0.25, 
(Mary gets the job, Paul is dropped) = 0.25, 
(Peter or Paul gets the job, Mary is dropped) = 0.25, 
(Peter or Paul gets the job, the other man is dropped) = 0.25 
all of which coincide with objective probabilities. One would then revise beliefs according 
to the information 
(Mary or Paul gets the job, Peter is dropped) = 1, 
or else 
(Mary or Peter gets the job, Paul is dropped) = 1. 
Applying the rules of the transferable belief model, the wagering probabilities discussed 
earlier all come out the same. 
4. A Dutch book 
The analysis presented in this section assumes that the player uses a linear utility 
function, that is, the desirabilities of wagers are in the same order as their average monetary 
pay-offs. The choice of the linear utility is conventional for small-stakes wagers, and 
promotes ease of exposition. An isomorphic example could be constructed using arbitrary 
utility units, but no gain in readability would be achieved. 
The Dutch book is made as follows. Before the first name is announced, the player is 
offered the lottery which pays: 
a gain of $1 .O 1 in the event that Mary gets the job, 
a loss of $1 in the event that Peter or Paul gets the job. 
This lottery is strictly acceptable under the linear utility function since 
(0.5 times $1.01) > (0.5 times $1). 
Thus, the transferable belief model advises the player to accept this wager. An orthodox 
Bayesian would do likewise. The bet is more than fair. 
That deal concluded, the bookie then offers the following proposition, still prior to the 
announcement of the first name. 
In return for your payment to me of $0.11 right now, I agree that if Mary’s name is 
announced, then I shall forgive your obligations under the wager which you have just 
made. 
This is a generous offer. In the event that Mary’s name is announced, the player would 
hold a debt of $1 for certain-the player would simply have lost the original bet. The right 
to rid oneself of this obligation would have an expected worth under pre-announcement 
beliefs of 
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0.25 times $1 = $0.25 
which exceeds the asking price of $0.11. The transferable belief model offers the same 
advice as the Bayesian orthodoxy. The player should pay the $0.11, and acquire the 
“hedge” option. It is a good buy, plain and simple. The bookie has been generous to a 
fault throughout the story. 
The hiring procedure ensues. If Mary’s name is announced, then the player ends up 
losing the $0.11 which was paid for the option. If a man’s name is announced, then the 
bookie makes one last offer: 
I shall pay you $0.01 right now, if you surrender your rights and obligations under 
the wager you now hold. 
This is not a “hypothetical” wager offered before a name is announced. It is a 
new “factual” wagering opportunity, available only if a man’s name has actually been 
announced, and disclosed only after the announcement. The transferable belief model 
player owns a lottery which offers, according to the beliefs then prevailing, an even chance 
to gain $1 .Ol or else to lose $1. The expected value of this lottery is less than $0.01, so the 
advice of the model will be to make the exchange. The player who accepts this advice sells 
the lottery for a gain of $0.01, less the $0.11 paid for the option, for a net loss of $0.10 on 
the series of transactions. 
It is uncertain whether the player would notice the Dutch book as it unfolded. If Mary’s 
name is called, then the player has lost a bet in an ordinary way, and knows nothing about 
the other offer which will never be made. If, say, Peter is culled, then the bookie has no 
incentive to point out that the same option would have been proposed if Paul had been 
eliminated. Even a suspicious player would have no clear evidence of trickery without the 
bookie’s testimony. (“Dutch what? No, Paul’s a friend, and I do not want it to get out that 
I was betting against him personally. If Peter had made it this far, I would not care”.) 
A Bayesian avoids the Dutch book, of course. Regardless of how the Bayesian allocates 
probabilities between the two men originally, then it is easy to show that in at least one 
case where a man is eliminated, Mary’s prospects will be rated no less than 2: 1 against 
the surviving man. The high confidence of the Bayesian regarding Mary’s chances in that 
case will make the original lottery worth more to the player than the $0.01 exchange price, 
and so the terms of the lottery will be carried out. The Bayesian finishes up in that case 
with either a net gain of $0.90 if Mary gets the job, or else a total loss of $1.11 if she does 
not. 
There is no need to allocate belief between the two men in order to participate in this 
favorable game and avoid the Dutch book. The original lottery requires no allocation, since 
the player’s loss is the same for either man’s success. The same is true if Mary’s name is 
called. It is simple to verify that the objective probability that Mary gets the job given that 
some man’s name is called is two thirds. One could just ignore which man’s name has been 
called. The player need not believe that Mary has 2: 1 odds of prevailing over whichever 
specific man survives; that depends on the unknown post-tails job selection procedure. The 
policy of “picking Mary” on the occasion that either man’s name is called, however, is 
objectively a 2: 1 commitment. Betting really can be different from believing. 
But the transferable belief model player is advised to bet according to one’s beliefs. The 
player could simply decline the model’s advice if a man’s name is called first. It is difficult 
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to see why anyone committed to the model’s concept of belief revision would want to do 
that, even if the player suspects sharp practice. If a man’s name has been called, then one’s 
beliefs are evenly split if the model is right. The $0.11 is gone (with no basis for regret, 
the purchase was shrewd), the $0.01 for certain is the better prospect, or so the model says. 
Why not take it? 
Surely, the player ought not to decline the exchange in order to “avoid’ a Dutch book. 
To succumb to a Dutch book is nothing more or less than to put oneself in situation like 
this. The advice has been given. What one does about it is beside the point. 
5. What is learned when a rival is eliminated 
The feature of the transferable belief model which is exploited in the Dutch book of 
the previous section is that the model does not allow the elimination of a male rival to 
preserve the ordinal estimate of Mary’s prospects relative to the surviving man. This belief 
revision behavior conflicts both with Bayesianism and with an intuition that is not peculiar 
to probabilists. 
Before any name was announced, in all probability distributions which satisfy the 
constraints imposed by the Dempster-Shafer belief functions, 
p(Mary gets the job) > p(Pau1 gets the job), 
p(Mary gets the job) 2 p(Peter gets the job) 
and at least one inequality is strict. In the particular probability distribution chosen by 
the transferable belief model, both inequalities are strict. After a male rival is eliminated, 
however, 
p(Mary gets the job) = p(Pau1 gets the job), 
or else 
p(Mary gets the job) = p(Peter gets the job). 
This subtle but fraught ordinal shift cannot happen in the Bayesian revision schema, as is 
well known and easily shown using familiar properties of probability. Suppose we have 
three sentences x, y, and z. If z is exclusive of the other two sentences, then 
xr\-_z*x and yr\-zey 
so 
p(x) = p(x A -z> and p(y) = p(y A -z). 
If further we have p(z) < 1, so p(-z) > 0, then by a widely used general rule, 
p(x 1 -z) 3 p(y I -z> if and only if p(x A -z) 3 p(y A -z> 
leading to the conclusion that if p(z) < 1, 
ptx I -z) 3 p(y I -z) if and only if P(X) 3 P(Y). 
In words, eliminating rivals preserves the prior credibility ordering of the survivors. 
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The remaining case, where the probability of z is unity, is not relevant to the present 
discussion. The men must survive the coin flip to succeed. The case is interesting when 
it does come up, though, since finding that -z obtains (in a finite domain of alternatives) 
would be “learning the impossible”-and that one’s beliefs are simply wrong. 
The notion that eliminating rivals preserves the order of the survivors can be motivated 
from other intuitions besides those specific to probability. A staple of the case-based 
reasoning literature is a principle which may be stated 
If knowing c would lead to some conclusion, and if knowing d would lead to the 
same conclusion, then knowing c v d also leads to that conclusion. 
Neither probabilists nor all case-based reasoners would assent to that statement in its full 
generality, but the intuition behind the disjunctive principle is respectable [3]. 
Applying this idea to the elimination of rivals situation, suppose c is exclusive of a and 
of 6, and that sentences are completely and definitely ordered with respect to credibility. 
That is, two sentences are either strictly ordered with respect to one another, or else in 
equipoise. Knowing c to be true would make a and b equally credible: they would both be 
false. Thus, both senses of weak ordering are true when c is true. So, under the disjunctive 
principle, whatever weak ordering prevailed between a and b when c was known to be 
false would also prevail when c v -c were known to be true, which is to say, as soon as the 
problem is stated or a priori. The converse follows easily for a complete definite ordering 
of sentence credibilities by a reductio. 
Adherence to the elimination-of-a-rival principle by itself does not necessarily provide 
protection against Dutch books. With some attention to the specific numbers used, if the 
coin which decides between Mary and the men were slightly biased in favor of heads, 
then the transferable belief model would succumb to the same book without violating the 
ordinal principle. 
Nevertheless, the model’s differences regarding the features of intuitive belief revision 
are not confined to orthodox Bayesian dogma. Its disagreement with a not-specifically- 
probabilist intuition is sufficient to elicit anomalous gambling advice from the model. 
6. Conclusions 
The transferable belief model was said to offer gambling advice of the same quality as 
the orthodox Bayesian method according to a criterion advanced by Bayesians themselves. 
The purpose of the present paper is to evaluate that performance claim, and to give some 
explanation of what goes wrong when the assertion is revealed to be false. 
The wagering anomaly presented illustrates a questionable feature of the probabilistic 
constraint interpretation of the underlying belief revision method. Elimination of a rival 
can disrupt the credibility ordering of the surviving hypotheses, contrary to the probabilist 
intuition presumably needed for the interpretation to be cogent. The enhanced specificity of 
Dempster-Shafer revision methods discussed by Kyburg [4] is not an unalloyed advantage 
over Bayesian approaches, but a principled disagreement about what may be inferred 
from evidence. Kyburg did warn that belief functions might come to grief in gambling 
applications when interpreted probabilistically. 
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Gambling difficulty in itself does not reflect poorly on the merits of the Dempster-Shafer 
formalism as a belief manager. Shafer, in a commentary published with [5], suggested 
that wagering advice need not agree with belief management eachings. This suggestion 
is entirely in the spirit of the transferable belief model, with its distinct credal and pignic 
elements. The results presented here suggest that betting and believing might profitably be 
separated even more thoroughly than the modelers proposed. 
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